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Introduction
Ever since the conclusions of the European Councils of Cologne and Helsinki – in other
words: ever since the watershed event of the war in Kosovo in spring 1999 – the issue
of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and even a Common European
Policy on Security and Defence (CEPSD) are on the top of the European agenda. The
European Union is finding itself in the midst of a discussion about the means it should
dispose of in order to cohesively act abroad, diplomatically and militarily.
This recent and breath-taking development marks a major shift in the general discourse
on the European Union. The European Union, long conceived of as a “mere” civilian
power is now arriving at a language of the past, a language which may provocatively
called the language of “war and peace”. This discourse entails central political
questions. Europe is discussing its role in the international diplomatic and security
environment. It defines the kind of international order it envisages.
By the same token, foreign policy is not only about a state’s relationship with the
outside world. The content of foreign policy equally reveals which values and
principles constitute a state’s political community internally. Thus, the evolution of a
European system of foreign policy governance allows for an alternative view on one of
the most contested and most opaque puzzles of European integration: The configuration
of the European citizenry’s identity. What impact has the institutional development of a
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) exerted on the shape of the European
polity and its identity? Does European foreign policy in fact “fire back” on identity as
the title of this paper so confidently claims? Under which conditions does it shape
which kind of (substantive) idea of a European citizenry?
In answering this question, I will first, embark on a conceptual discussion. How do we
need to conceive of foreign policy in order to allow for the linkage between foreign
policy and citizenship? The decisive step consists of using an extended definition of
the state as the base-line of inquiry. Conceptually, the state may not be based merelyGuessgen: CFSP – It fires back!
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upon the presence of centralised government and territorial sovereignty, but it equally
requires the inclusion of the concept of identity as an important benchmark.
Accordingly, in the first part of this paper, I will elaborate on a constructivist definition
of the state as an analytical blue-print for examining the texture of the European Union.
In the second part, I will devise tentative hypothesis on the impact of the evolution of
the European foreign policy governance system on the definition of a European
identity. This section is split in two periods: A pre-Kosovo period and a post-Kosovo
period. The pre-Kosovo period, I find, is not likely to have contributed to the
development of a common identity conception. The post-Kosovo period, on the other
hand, has opened up considerable opportunities to do so. It has created leeway for a
discourse which is central for the emergence of a European identity: The de-coupling of
the United States.
1. Concepts: The State, Foreign Policy, and Citizenship in the European Union
What does a European foreign policy have to do with the substantive definition of the
features of a European citizenship? On first sight, foreign policy and citizenship cannot
be related to each other directly. Their only commonality is their respective dependence
upon the state. Foreign policy is a state activity geared at the outside world. There
cannot be a foreign policy without a state. Equally, citizenship provisions demarcate
legally who belongs to the state and who does not. Without the state, there would not be
any citizenship. Analytically, therefore, our abilities to conceive of the linkage between
foreign policy and citizenship depends upon the definitional scope of the “transmission
belt” state. Here, as I will explain below, the state needs to be conceived of as a
political unit characterised not only – or not even most importantly – by territory and
centralized government, but by a binding identity.
A sate does not merely consist of an institutional arrangement (centralised government
and territory) but is equally based on a cultural or ideational agreements. A state is
based upon an identity. However, an identity is not a given but is in constant flux and
subject to constant changes. Foreign policy – a state’s actions vis-à-vis the outside -
then not only serves as the expression of this identity but equally determines and
constitutes it. Citizenship, on the other hand, functions as an expression of this identity,
an indicator. Therefore, one may argue that the conduct of foreign policy allows for
conclusions about the substantive content of citizenship within a certain political
community.Guessgen: CFSP – It fires back!
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How can this rather abstract conceptual suggestion be usefully applied to the European
Union? The problem with analysing the European Union – this strange and sui generis
political animal – with even conceptualising it, has always been the dominance of a
state definition based on centralised government. Without centralised government, thus
states the basic argument, there is no European state. Without a state, the story
continues, there is no foreign policy. This claim, as has been pointed out by several
authors, is neither doing justice to the state as a historically contingent form of political
organisation nor to the kind of political organisation the European Union represents.
The state needs to be viewed as a political community sharing some kind of common
idea about the organization of public life. It is only then that the “state of Europe” can
be re-considered in a fruitful manner. How does foreign policy fit in such a state
conception? Which relationship to the concept of citizenship can be established? What
do both tell us about state transformation in Europe?
The State
My arguments are based upon a constructivist ontology, which, in turn rests upon three
claims: First, the world is socially constructed. Intersubjectively shared knowledge
constitutes the structure which constrains the options available to the actors. Second,
structure precedes action but simultaneously results from action. This is to say action
changes structure. Third, political order rests upon normative prescriptions embedded
in the structure. Constructivists
1 assume that the world does not consist of objectively
given entities. Quite the contrary, the world is a “social fact,” constructed
intersubjectively by a given political community. Adler defined the structure – the sum
of social facts - as knowledge that “ … persists beyond the lives of individual social
actors, embedded in social routines and practices as they are reproduced by interpreters
who participate in their production and workings. Intersubjective meanings have
structural attributes that do not merely constrain or empower actors. They also define
their social reality.
2” The intersubjective quality of the constructivist world serves as
the lynchpin of the argument and, by the same token, as a safeguard against pure
1 Notwithstanding the general agreement on the aforementioned postulates, constructivism, like any
other “paradigmatical” camp, is not necessarily an amalgam of happy scholarly bedfellows. Quite the
contrary, the ontological and the epistemological differences within the group roughly labeled
“constructivism” is quite striking. See: Adler, Emanuel, ”Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism
in World Politics, in: European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 3 (3), (1997), p.327
2 Adler, Emanuel, ”Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics, in: European Journal
of International Relations, Vol. 3 (3), (1997), p.327.Guessgen: CFSP – It fires back!
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(relativist) volatility, as Friedrich Kratochwil has pointed out: “… [A]lthough the
human world is one of artifice, it is not an idiosyncratic or subjective creation. Rather,
it is through the intersubjectivity of language, and its shared meaning that social order
is created.
3” While the first claim is commonsensical, the second claim is highly
problematic for the constructivist congregation, namely the question of change and the
role of agency within this change. Constructivists deviate from methodological
individualism as much as they deviate from mere structuralism. For them, agent and
structure are mutually constitutive, which implies that the structure precedes and
determines the actor but that the actor himself has the chance of altering and changing
the structure. Thus, intersubjective interpretations are changed through action. This
action is primarily defined as communication through speech-acts. Although the
argument has a sound – and almost commonsensical – theoretical content, it proves
hard to pin down empirically. The third claim ties together structure and agency. It is
through the prescriptive – normative - function of the structural component that the
limits of action are determined. Norms de-limit the scope of action. These propositions
have been introduced and discussed extensively in the literature. I will spare the reader
further elaborations. Following up on the discussion in the previous section, I am
interested in the use of this meta-theoretical earthquake for the analysis of foreign
policy. Which implications does the constructivist argument contain for the definition
of the state?
In fact, constructivism does not have a theory of the state proper. In fact, constructivism
does not have a theory of anything proper. It is, as several authors have mentioned,
primarily a set of meta-theoretical or ontological conjectures. In that, its application
leaves a great leeway to the respective author in devising concepts and applying them
to his or her specific subject matter of research. Here, I present a definition and
conceptualization of the state, which starts from the assumption that the state is a social
construct in the sense of Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Community.O nt h a tb a s i s ,o n e
build the state upon four inter-connected conceptual pillars, each in line with
constructivist ontology: The state is conceived of as a system of governance which
does not rely on a the presence of centralized government but on the presence of an
identity of the political community. This identity entails normative prescriptions.T h e
parts of this system are tied together by the legitimacy of the political authority. These
concepts are now being addressed in turn.
3 Kratochwil, Friedrich, “Constructivism as an Approach to International Law and InternationalGuessgen: CFSP – It fires back!
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Traditionally, the presence of centralized government has served as one of the decisive
benchmarks of statehood. The authority of government “tied” all those citizens
together, which were living on the territory a government claimed jurisdiction of. Now,
if the state, in line with the basic constructivist argument, is a social construct, one
might infer that its existence, i.e. the legitimacy of its government is based upon more
than the mere monopoly of the use of force. Therefore, it appears to be a fruitful step to
grant, even terminologically, space for this “more.” Therefore, the first conceptual
innovation consists of introducing the term governance instead of government. Rainer
Eising and Beate Kohler-Koch define the term “governance” as follows: “In essence,
‘governance’ is about the structured ways and means in which the divergent
preferences of independent actors are translated into policy choices to ‘allocate values’,
so that the plurality of interests is transformed into co-ordinated action and the
compliance of actors is achieved.
4” Centralized government is but one possible feature
of a system of “governance”. The presence of centralized government might be neither
necessary nor sufficient to translate divergent preferences of independent actors into
policy. This proposition begs for the follow-up question. If it is not centralized
government which is constitutive of a decision-making system, or even not only
centralized government, which are the constitutive elements then? The entry point for
answering this question is the concept of legitimacy. Let me repeat the Weberian state
definition cited above: “Staat is diejenige menschliche Gemeinschaft, welche innerhalb
eines bestimmten Gebietes – dies: das ‘Gebiet’, gehört zum Merkmal – das Monopol
legitimer physischer Gewaltsamkeit für sich (mit Erfolg) beansprucht
5.” Note that two
of Weber’s criteria - territoriality and hierarchical decision-making - have been
included in most of the common definitions of statehood. They are relatively easy to
spot empirically. The aspect of legitimacy, on the other hand, has frequently been
omitted, possibly due to its fuzzy character. Yet legitimacy is central in that only those
political decisions which are considered legitimate have a binding force. Legitimacy
needs to be awarded by those concerned. In practice, legitimacy can be either
processual in character or substantive. The processual aspect of legitimacy pertains to
the proper procedure in respect to the investiture of the political authority as well as to
the process of decision-making. The proper process of selecting political leaders in the
modern Western state is linked to democracy. The substantive dimension of legitimacy
pertains to the content of the policy decisions. Political decisions have to be within a
range of policies which are considered proper. It is only then that they pass the
Politics”, Unpublished Paper (Presented at Georgetown University in November 1996), p.9.
4 Kohler-Koch Beate and Rainer Eising (eds.) The transformation of governance in the European
Union (London and New York : Routledge, 1999), p.5.Guessgen: CFSP – It fires back!
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“legitimacy test”. In the next step, then, one may ask: Where do the standards of
legitimacy come from? Where are they rooted? How do we know what is considered
right and wrong and which policy is considered proper and which is not?
Here, I assume a specific “state identity” to represent the “pool” of policies that are
considered “acceptable” by those concerned, i.e. the citizens. On an abstract level, the
term identity comprises the sum of an actor’s knowledge pertaining to rules of social
behavior. This “knowledge” has been given several alternative names, depending on
the respective theoretical pedigree. A few examples may suffice: Lebenswelt
(Habermas), Frames (Jachtenfuchs), belief systems (George) or, most prominently,
identity. On a less abstract level, the idea of the existence of an identity implies that
every single act an agent performs is rooted in a coherent set of interpretations.
Embedded therein are prescriptions on proper behavior – norms - which Martha
Finnemore defines " ... in a simple and sociologically standard way as shared
expectations about appropriate behavior held by a community of actors
6."
The difference between an identity-based state definition and positivist state conception
cannot be exaggerated. Instead of assuming that a centralized government ties separate
state entities together, identity functions as the “glue” that unites the citizenry. Above, I
have argued that the state is the basic unit to which both foreign policy and citizenship
are tied. Given the constructivist state definition, how can these two concepts be
integrated? Which functions do they fulfill?
Foreign Policy
What is foreign policy? What are its functions? Foreign policy inherently is a state
activity. It is, as an undergraduate introduction to the analysis of international relations,
puts it ” … the output of the state into the global system …
7[Italics added by me,
F.G.]” It is about the articulation of a state’s interests and the realization thereof. A
state disposes of several means – diplomacy, force, money, and “culture” – to realize
these interests.
5 Weber, Max, Politik als Beruf (Ditzingen: Reclam, 1992), p.6.
6 Finnemore, Martha: National Interest in International Society (Itahca and London: Cornell University
Press, 1996), p.22.
7 Russett, Bruce and Harvey Starr, World Politics. The Menu for Choice (New York: W.H. Freeman
and Company, 1996), p.162.Guessgen: CFSP – It fires back!
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In that the content of these interests is rooted in a political community’s identity, the
values it cherishes and the norms it adheres to. It is this “identity” which is being
projected to the outside world. In that, foreign policy is an inside-out process. However,
foreign policy also has a crucial domestic function. In voicing its interests vis-à-vis
others a political community – acting as a whole – equally becomes visible to itself.
Foreign policy not only creates the “other”, it also reaffirms the “self”. It symbolizes
the state and its community much more than any other policy area. Foreign policy
“fires back
8.” Jonathan Bach summed up this relationship between foreign policy and
identity as follows: “Foreign policy is the key practice through which sovereignty –
and with it core assumptions of identity – is articulated. Maintaining one’s own
sovereignty, and the integrity of the system of sovereign nation-states, is the primary
theoretical task of foreign policy. The principle of state sovereignty serves to delimit
(and discipline) the realm of inside and outside, and foreign policy is the primary way
in which the state expresses this delimiting function. Foreign policy exists in a
dialectical relation with the concept of sovereignty: without a concept of sovereignty,
foreign policy is meaningless, but since sovereignty is not an a priori given, the
understanding of sovereignty is partially dependent on the practices of foreign policy.
9”
David Campbell has most convincingly elaborated this relationship. Here, I will refrain
from discussing it any further and instead focus on the link between the state, foreign
policy, and citizenship.
Citizenship
The notion of citizenship essentially is a legal term. The legal concept fulfils two
functions. First, it determines who belongs to a certain political community – and who
does. In general, citizenship can be acquired either by birth (ascription)o rb yr e q u e s t
(naturalisation). The criteria for each vary. Usually, they include elements of
descendancy as in the "the law of the blood" principle (jus sanguinis ) and elements of
"the law of the soil principle (jus soli.") In that it is an instrument of exclusion.
Secondly, citizenship defines the individual citizen’s rights and duties within that
community. The substantive content of citizenship is usually evaluated according to a
“thick” conception which emphasizes the element of duties and participation and a
“thin” conception which emphasizes the aspect of negative rights - a conception, which
complies rather with the liberal ideal of the the Nachtwaechterstaat? The legal notion
8 Campbell, David, Writing Security. United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992).Guessgen: CFSP – It fires back!
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of citizenship has prominently been used as a heuristic tool to extrapolate the “identity”
of a political community, most notably a state or a nation-state. This tool has been most
skilfully applied by Rogers Breaker
10 who compared identity conceptions in Germany
and France.
Here, however, the legal provisions of the citizenship concept within the European
Union are not of primary interest. As elaborated in the Treaties of Maastricht and
Amsterdam, citizenship within the European Union is primarily conceived of as a
“liberal” or a “thin” concept. I will not recount the specific treaty provisions here, but
Mary O'Rourke, for example, giving a speech on the priorities of the Irish presidency
cited an anonymous critic who stated that "the concept of Union citizenship as
embodied in the Maastricht Treaty amounts to nothing more than a new name for a
bunch of existing rights, a nice blue ribbon around scattered elements of a general
notion of citizenship. The dynamism is ... pie in the sky.
11"
Thus, citizenship here is viewed less as a legal concept
12 but more as one dimension of
a wider discourse on the “rights” and “duties” that flow from an individual’s belonging
to the European Union. In that sense, I am defining the term citizenship in the sense
Friedrich Kratochwil does: "It is perhaps best to conceive of 'citizenship' as a space
within a discourse on politics that institutionalises identities and differences by drawing
boundaries, both in term of membership and in terms of the actual political practices
which are connected with this membership.
13"
Foreign policy creates and re-creates a member state’s identity. Citizenship serves as a
manifestation of a state’s identity. To which extent then, has the foreign policy of the
European Union contributed to the evolution of a European identity, i.e. a European
citizenship?
2. Does it fire back? EPC, CFSP and European Identity
9 Bach, Jonathan P.G., Between Sovereignty and Integration. German Foreign Policy and National
Identity after 1989 (St. Martin’s Press: New York, 1999), p.60.
10 See also Brubaker, Rogers (ed.), Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North
America (German Marshall Fund and University Press of America; Lanham, Md.; 1989).
11 O'Rourke, Mary , "The Union and its Citizens," (Speech delivered at the Institute of European
Affairs Conference on "The priorities of the Irish Presidency," May 25, 1996, Dublin Castle, Ireland.
12 It should be highlighted. The use of the term citizenship in a sense which is not specifically tied to
citizenship as a legal concept is somewhat problematic when it comes to the distinction between
identity and citizenship. In essence, both concepts aim at the definition of the individual citizen from
the viewpoint of a coherent normative structure formed through intersubjective informal agreement.Guessgen: CFSP – It fires back!
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In the analysis of the European Union both concepts – foreign policy and citizenship –
are moving targets. And they are moving slowly. The European Union is not a state in
the proper sense. It lacks centralised government. Yet, often the Union has been
depicted as a system of governance. This equally applies to foreign policy. From EPC
to CFSP to the installation of the High Representative for Common Foreign and
Security Policy, a governance system in respect to foreign policy has been created. Has
the emergence of a European system of foreign policy governance then contributed to
the emergence of a European citizenship? In the following sections, I will elaborate
primarily on the theoretical possibility of an European identity to evolve which
different institutional expressions of foreign policy governance have allowed for. The
specific “hard” empirical evidence for each of these claims still needs to be elaborated.
European Foreign Policy from EPC to CFSP: A Private Affair
Has the European system of foreign policy governance had a major impact on the
creation of a “thicker” notion of European citizenship? For a long time, namely until
the war in Kosovo, it does not appear to, or only in a very restricted manner. A system
of European foreign policy governance has been in the making, although in an almost
private manner. In order for foreign policy to have an effect on wider identity
formation, however, it needs to be public. This argument will be substantiated in the
following sections.
The coordination of the foreign policy of the member states of the European Union has
been a persistent element of European integration
14. The 1954 project of the European
Defense Community (EDC), the Fouchet Plans (1962) and the European Political
Cooperation (EPC) of 1969 are points in case. Gordon acknowledges “… [f]or decades,
and in particular since the 1991 Treaty on European Union ... the EU has been trying to
enhance its ability to act diplomatically and militarily abroad
15.” Ben Soetendorp even
goes as far as to call the formulation and the realization of a common foreign policy a
13 Kratochwil, Friedrich, Citizenship. On the border of order, Paper (University of Pennsylvania),
Aug.1994, p.3.
14 Although I expect events to be examined to date back further than the formal creation of the
European Union (1993), I proceed to subsume the European Communities (EC) under the abbreviation
EU.
15 Gordon, Philip H.: Europe’s Uncommon Foreign Policy, in: International Security (22:3), 1998,
p.75.Guessgen: CFSP – It fires back!
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„continuous goal of the member states
16“. While the ambitious EDC and the de Gaulle-
driven Fouchet Plans were still born projects, cooperation in respect to the foreign
policy started to gain pace with the installation of the European Political Cooperation
(EPC) in 1970. The Luxembourg Report, also called the “Davignon Report”, published
on October 27, 1970 called for regular consultations, for the exchange of information,
the harmonization of positions, and where, possible common actions. These
mechanisms where to provide a better mutual understanding on the great problems of
international politics
17.
The foreign affairs ministers were now to meet at least twice per year to discuss matters
of importance to foreign policy. Simultaneously, a Political Committee (PoCo), which
was supposed to meet at least four times a year was created in order to prepare the
ministerial conferences. It should be noted, however, that the EPC mechanism
remained completely and explicitly outside the framework of the European
Communities. EPC and EC approached each other only slowly. In 1973 the
Copenhagen Report described that a “permanent constructive dialogue” with the EC
had become regular practice
18 and that the inter-governmental contacts on the
ministerial as well as the diplomatic level had been intensified. In 1981, the London
report tied EC and EPC closer together by assigning the rotating EC’s Presidency the
responsibility of coordinating EC and EPC topics at the Foreign Ministers’ meetings
and by allowing the Commission to be “fully associated with the EPC at all levels.
19”
The 1983 Solemn Declaration of Stuttgart stated that ”the European Council ensures
consistency
20 between EC and EPC” and that the EC Council of Ministers could deal
with matters coming within the scope of EPC. In 1986, with the Single European Act
(SEA), the Community and the EPC were put on the same contractual basis
21. In 1993,
EPC, now labeled Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), was integrated as “the
second pillar” in the framework of the (Maastricht) Treaty on the European Union
(TEU). The Treaty of Maastricht called upon the member states of the European Union
to act as a ”cohesive force” in international relations and extended and specified the
16 Soetendorp, Ben. “The Evolution if the EC/Eu as a Sincgle Foreign Policy Actor”, in Carlsnaes,
Walter and Steve Smith (eds.), European Foreign Policy: the EC and Changing Perspectives in Europe
(London: Sage, 1994), p.103.
17 Gerbet, Pierre, Francoise de la Serre and Gerard Nafilyan (eds), L’Union politique de l’Europe.
Jalons et textes (La documentation francaise: Paris, 1998), pp.168.
18 Schmalz, Uwe, ”The Amsterdam Provisions on External Coherence: Bridging the Union’s Foreign
Policy Dualism,” European Foreign Affairs Review, (3) 1998, p.422.
19 Ibid, p.423.
20 On the notion of consistency, see Smith, Karen E., The Making of EU Foreign Policy. The Case of
Eastern Europe (Houndmills: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1999)., p.4.Guessgen: CFSP – It fires back!
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instruments and decision-making procedures at hand. The Amsterdam Treaty
introduced the position of the High Representative for the Common Foreign and
Security Policy and specified the means at the Union’s disposal.
Although the Maastricht and the Amsterdam Treaties call upon the member states of
the European Union to act as a ”cohesive force in international relations, the call has
not been heeded in an institutionally apt manner. Consensual decision-making remains
the starting point for any common foreign policy. The ”dual structure” labeling the
division of foreign policy tasks between Commission and Council of Ministers has
essentially been maintained. The Western European Union (WEU), potentially
representing the military dimension of the European Union, has only been associated
loosely. Institutionally, the center of foreign policy remains located at the national
level. Foreign policy institutions have not jumped over the threshold of
intergovernmentalism. Despite these severe limitations, however, the record does not
necessarily need to be negative. It is conceivable that in the ”civilian” realm the Union
has scored some points in devising a coherent approach.
How did the EU institutions then fare in their foreign policy practice? How did they
perform? The record, at best, is mixed. In terms of foreign performance, the EU
institutions so far have displayed more weakness than strength. As some authors
mention, as of the early 1970s, especially during the time immediately following the oil
shocks and the cooling down of transatlantic relations, Europe has succeeded in
devising a rather coherent policy toward the Middle East. It has been very successful in
the CSCE process. The same applies, after the end of the Cold War, to countries in
Eastern Europe, as Karen Smith has claimed
22. On the other hand, the EU failed to
implement an effective policy in conflicts arising after the end of the cold war, most
prominently the war in former Yugoslavia. The lack of any ”unified European action”
was equally evident throughout the repeated crises in the Persian Gulf
23.A no v e r a l l
balance sheet would rather present a negative judgment of the performance of the EU.
Christopher Hill writes: ”True actorness requires not only a clear identity and a self-
contained decision-making system, but also the practical capabilities to effect policy.
21 Gerbet, Pierre, Francoise de la Serre and Gerard Nafilyan (eds), L’Union politique de l’Europe.
Jalons et textes (La documentation francaise: Paris, 1998, p. 266.
22 Smith, Karen E., The Making of EU Foreign Policy. The Case of Eastern Europe (Houndmills:
Macmillan Press Ltd, 1999).
23 Pfetsch, Frank ”Tensions in Sovereignty: Foreign Policy of EC Members compared,” in Carlsnaes,
Walter and Steve Smith (eds.), European Foreign Policy: the EC and Changing Perspectives in Europe
(London: Sage, 1994), pp.120-137, here: p.126.Guessgen: CFSP – It fires back!
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In all these dimensions the EU falls some way short.[Italics added, F.G.]
24”W h i c h
effect did the EPC and the pre-Kosovo CFSP exert on the definition of the Union’s
citizenship? In sum, I consider the impact to be non-existent. This is due to the nature
of the EPC and CFSP projects. Both primarily aimed at ensuring cooperation and
coordination among foreign affairs ministries (FAM). Disregarding the balance sheet of
this coordination efforts, it was marked by several distinct features.
First, the EPC/CFSP machinery did not succeed in creating a European discourse on
foreign policy. The argument about the identity-creating effect of foreign policy hinges
upon the condition of public participation or at least public acknowledgement of the
respective foreign policy. Public attention is primarily drawn to crisis situations within
which questions pertaining to “war and peace” are to be answered. Given the
institutional restrictions of the EPC process, i.e. the absence of a military dimension,
the EPC could not depict itself as a cohesive actor in these situations. Quite the
contrary, these were answered on a national basis. If “push came to shove” the
European Union, i.e. the European Communities, had to withdraw. However, if foreign
policy functions as an engine of identity creation for a political community, the
community concerned needs to be involved, either in the discourse about the respective
foreign policy. Neither EPC nor CFSP created a forum for a European discourse on
foreign policy. This is not to say that EPC and CFSP are not likely to have had an effect
on the identities of specific actors, namely diplomats or politicians which have been
involved in the process. In that EPC and CFSP may in fact have had a state
transforming impact for they might have Europeanized the national identities of
governmental agents. But this certainly does not lead to a substantive determination of
the content of a European citizenship
25.
Secondly, in the process of EPC and CFSP debates about a specifically European
political approach have been avoided and, by the same token, have not been forced to
arise from the outside. Although EPC has build upon the principle of co-ordination, its
political intention, has been handled in a rather modest manner, that is to say, the
member states of the European Union aimed at a cohesive policy. However, this was
not built upon the notion of some coherent political strategy about the European Union.
In that sense, it has not always been clear in which direction the process of foreign
policy integration was heading and which script it was to follow. In that sense, answers
24 Hill, Christopher and William Wallace, ”Introduction: actors and actions” Christopher Hill (ed), The
Actors in Europe’s Foreign Policy (London and New York, Routledge, 1996), p.13.Guessgen: CFSP – It fires back!
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to general questions: Which goals does Europe pursue in the world, i.e. who is Europe
as a political actor, which ideal of political order does it intent to implement etc. were
avoided. On the other hand the general idea about a specific political order which is to
be projected to the outside bestows substantive content upon the definition of the
citizenship. This has not been the case within the European Union.
Third, in addition, one may argue that the member states of the European Union did
define themselves not primarily in European terms but primarily in transatlantic terms.
In other words, the Soviet Union, during the Cold War did function as Europe’s “other”
but equally as the “other” of the United States which forged a transatlantic security
community which – despite several disturbances – proved to be the prime reference
point in respect to some kind of not state-based multi-lateral foreign and security
policy. In addition to this rather cognitive aspect, the importance of American presence
on European soil, a priori pre-cluded an over-emphasis on a specifically European
foreign policy.
In sum, I find that the EPC as well as the early CFSP did not offer the possibility to
translate discussions on the subject matter European foreign policy in a wider debate on
European identity. This, I argue, has changed considerably with the war in Kosovo.
Kosovo, the United States, and the Creation of Europe
The war in Kosovo, in spring 1999, has pushed the issue of European foreign policy to
the top of the political agenda and even extended it to the area of defense. What the
treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam had prepared hesitantly, the post-Kosovo
European Councils of Cologne and Helsinki have fervently put into place: An ever-
tighter foreign policy and security framework, personified by Mr. Javier Solana, the
High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP); the
concomitant installation of a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU) unit.
The Helsinki declaration heralds the ambitious goal to create a European Rapid
Reaction Force comprising 60,000 troops deployable within 60 days. By the year 2003
this contingent is supposed to be in place. In spring 2000 the institutional provisions
included in the conclusions of the Finnish Presidency at the Helsinki summit are
feverishly established in Brussels: The participation of the member states’ defence
ministers in the meetings of the General Affairs Council, the installation of a standing
25 This aspect constitutes the focal point of my doctoral dissertation. Empirically, I am examining theGuessgen: CFSP – It fires back!
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Political and Security Committee (PSC) composed of national representatives of
senior/ambassadorial level dealing with all aspects of CFSP, including the CEPSD
26,
the establishment of an EU Military Committee composed of the Chiefs of Defence,
represented by their military delegates, which will give military advice and make
recommendations to the PSC, as well as provide military direction to the Military Staff,
the establishment of an EU Military Staff within the Council structures which will
provide military expertise and support to the CESDP, including the conduct of EU-led
military crisis management operations.
However, as breath-taking the recent institutional activities as numerous are the
political questions which beg for answers: What should be the quality of the future
relationship between the European Union and the United States? Is a European military
capacity a complement or an alternative to NATO? Under which circumstances, is
European military action conceivable without NATO? To what extent is Europe
capable of acting? Which investments need to be made, in terms of procurement, in
order to reach a somewhat autonomous European defense capacity? What is the
structure of the European defense industry supposed to be like? On the basis of these
deliberations, the European decision-making structure moves to the fore: Who
organizes? Who decides? Based upon which information? Is it “Mr. CFSP” Javier
Solana, the High Representative of Foreign and Security Policy, who plays the
European foreign minister, or Commissioner Chris Patten? Which information does the
Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU), as of now poorly staffed, dispose
of?
These questions, and here is the difference to the pre-Kosovo foreign policy integration
process to be found, cannot be answered on an ad-hoc basis any more. They need to be
answered by reference to larger and more encompassing puzzles: What should Europe,
as a foreign policy actor, be? What does the European Union represent in terms of
foreign and defense policy? Which values are to be promulgated? Or, to put it more
bluntly: Which common element binds the 15 member states of the European Union in
manner which justifies the construction of a Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP) or even a Common European Security and Defense Policy (CEPSD)? The
Europeanization of diplomats’ identities in France and Germany.
26 See: Council of the European Union: “Preparatory document related to CESDP : ELABORATION
OF THE HEADLINE GOAL ´FOOD FOR THOUGHT´!” Press Release, 14-03-2000, Nr: 6756/00
and “Preparatory documents related to CESDP : MILITARY BODIES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
AND THE PLANNING AND CONDUCT OF EU-LED MILITARY OPERATIONS” Press Release,
29-02-2000, Nr: 6251/1/00, http://ue.eu.int/newsroom/main.Guessgen: CFSP – It fires back!
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political developments push for public answers to the most pressing questions: What
does the European Union represent in terms of foreign policy? Which values are to be
promulgated? To what extent does the European identity differ from the transatlantic
one?
The discourse on the integration of foreign and defence policy into the framework of
the European Union, ever since the war in Kosovo, is a public and it’s a political one.
In that, it creates a central forum of discussion on the bases of the community as a
whole. This opens up the possibility for foreign policy to turn into one of the main
factors shaping a European identity. My main argument here is that the discourse – not
necessarily the institutional implementations – that is currently arising in this respect
will serves as the starting point for a major European de-coupling of the United States.
It is the substantive differentiation from the US – at first, but not only in respect to
foreign and defence policy – which will substantially determine the shape of the
European citizenship. Why should the discourse on European foreign policy
governance be anti-American in character? Identity – the “selves” - are formed in
opposition to the “other”. This is an old story. In the 19
th century the Germans defined
themselves in opposition to the French and vice versa. In the 20
th century, the US
defined itself in opposition to the Soviet Union, post-WWII Germany conceived of
itself, as Waever has pointed out, in opposition to the past of the Holocaust and so on
and so forth. Which, then, could be Europe’s “other”? Russia may be depicted as a
threat. By the same token, Islamic – or partly Islamic states – may be constructed this
way. However, none of these “others” logically entails the self “Europe” as the logical
answer. Quite the contrary, in terms of security, the answer to these kinds of threats
would be a transatlantic one: NATO or, in other words, Karl Deutsch’s “pluralistic
security community
27” being based on the notion of liberal democracy. It is only, if
Europe distinguishes itself from its closest partner, the United States that it fact might
emerge as a political community with distinct features. In fact, however, “security”
arguments may merely serve as starting points for such a de-coupling.
But is this argument mere fiction? To what extent is it grounded in some kind of
political “reality”? Of course, any desire for a real disentanglement from the United
States is constantly and consciously denied on the European side of the Atlantic. On the
other hand, one may in fact detect signs and indicators of a growing estrangement
among the members of the pluralistic security community. The growing AmericanGuessgen: CFSP – It fires back!
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tendency to pursue unilateral strategies in its foreign and security policy have led to
major irritations among the Europeans – which did not necessarily have to be French.
This tendency has recently only been re-enforced by the American ambition to
construct a National Missile Defence Program (NMD), allegedly capable of protecting
American territory against a small number of missiles carrying nuclear war heads
originating from rogue states like North Korea or Iraq. For the Europeans, this program
is hard to swallow. This is so not only because the United States is watering down the
existing disarmament treaties but also because the US demonstrates that American
priorities do not necessarily comply with European priorities. Strikingly, the nascent
debate on NMD is likely to bring back strategic debates dating back to the times of the
Cold War: The European resistance to accept a shift in American nuclear strategy,
away from “massive retaliation” to “flexible response”, and the European “insecurities”
that followed. The current debate on the Common European Policy on Security and
Defence (CEPSDP) may partly be a response to this “trend”. It certainly does not
indicate that the European Union disposes either of technical or material capacities to
establish its own defence, however the mere fact that such an intention is denied marks
a shift in the range of conceivable futures
28.
However, “Europe” as the blunt answer to American unilateralism will not suffice to
contribute to the construction of a European identity if the differences between the US
and the member states of the European Union are not extrapolated beyond the limits of
security. This means, that in terms of security and foreign policy arrangements, the EU
needs to give an answer to a very specific question: In which cases would the EU act
abroad in which the United States would not? In other words, the European
“justification strategy” would be required to highlight the differences between the ideal
of a European world order and an American world order. In other words, the European
political project would need to be distinguished from the American political project.
Naturally, this goal is not to be achieved merely by recourse to the realm of defence.
Quite the contrary, these consideration require a justification which had to be based in
European socio-economic features: To put it provocatively, this might arise to the
“Third Way” as the justification for both – the de-coupling of the US and the
construction of a European foreign policy.
27 Deutsch Karl, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton University Press:
Princeton, 1969).
28 See Ruehl, Lothar, “Conditions and options for an autonomous ‘Common European Policy on
Security and Defence’ in and by the European Union in the post-Amsterdam perspective opened at
Cologne in June 1999,” Discussion Paper of the Center for European Integration Studies of the
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universitaet Bonn, No. 54 (1999).Guessgen: CFSP – It fires back!
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Thus, my main argument may be coined as follows: The development of the European
system of foreign and defence policy governance may push the Europeans to
extrapolate the differences between them and their closest partner, the United States. It
is in that discourse on the commonalties that tie the member states of the Union
together, that a substantive definition of European citizenship may in fact occur.
European foreign policy after Kosovo could fire back!
3. Conclusion
In the course of this paper I have examined the relationship between the evolution of a
European system of governance of foreign and security policy and the substantive
definition of a European citizenship. In a first step, I have established a conceptual
relationship between foreign policy, citizenship, and the state. I have argued that the
state definition needs to include the notion of identity – as an ideational component – if
a direct line between foreign policy and citizenship is to be drawn. Accordingly, a
political community’s foreign policy actions may in fact have a major impact on the
substantive definition of the community’s citizenship. In addition, the integration of the
concept of identity into a definition of the state allows for the examination of the
relationship between foreign policy and citizenship within the European Union –
despite the obvious absence of centralised government. In the second section of this
paper, I have roughly described the development of the European foreign policy
institutions before drawing tentative conclusions about their apparent impact on
citizenship. Prior to the war in Kosovo, I have claimed, neither EPC nor CFSP have
been likely engines of a European citizenship. It has been only after this watershed
event that a public and political discourse has changed the role of an ever-tighter
European foreign policy and defence policy governance system. Here, I have presented
a somewhat speculative and polemic follow-up claim. I have argued that the process of
European foreign policy integration will only have an impact on the substantive
definition of the European citizenry if it entails a debate on European differences to the
United States – not only in terms of security, but primarily in terms of economic and
social policies!Guessgen: CFSP – It fires back!
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